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In this paper we argue that in realistically calibrated two period general equilib-
rium models with incomplete markets CAPM-pricing provides a good benchmark for
equilibrium prices even when agents are not mean-variance optimizers and returns
are not normally distributed. We numerically approximate equilibria for a variety of
dierent specications for preferences, endowments and dividends and compare the
equilibrium prices and portfolio-holdings to the predictions of the CAPM. While the
CAPM does not hold exactly for the chosen specication, it turns out that pricing-
errors are extremely small. Furthermore, two-fund separation holds approximately.
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The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) pre-
dicts that equilibrium returns of assets are a linear function of their market  (the ratio
of the covariance of the asset and the market's return over the variance of the market's
return). This intuitively appealing result has long shaped the way practitioners think
about average returns and risk. While the model fares poorly in explaining observed cross-
sectional stock returns (see for example Fama and French (1992)) it remains one of the
central building blocks in nancial economics.
One of the reasons for this is that the CAPM provides a good theoretical starting
point for the examination of asset prices. Geanakoplos and Shubik (1990) show that the
CAPM can be viewed as a special case of the general equilibrium model with incomplete
asset markets (the GEI-model). Oh (1996), Willen (1997) and others have shown that
the central conclusions of the CAPM hold true under completely general dividends and
endowments as long as all agents have mean-variance utility functions and common beliefs
on the distribution of future states of the world.
However, without mean-variance preferences one has to make very strong assumptions
on the distribution of asset pay-os in order to derive the conclusions of the CAPM1. Berk
(1997) shows that joint restrictions on utility functions and asset returns cannot lead to
more realistic assumptions. He shows that if one assumes that agents have von-Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions, quadratic utility is necessary for the CAPM-pricing formula
to hold. Since quadratic utility is an unattractive assumption, it is an important question
whether CAPM-pricing provides a benchmark for the cross-section of security prices in a
model with more general preferences, endowments and asset returns. Empirical contradic-
tions of the CAPM might be explained by the fact that some agents are not mean-variance
optimizers and that many securities have returns that are far from elliptical.
In this paper we show that independently of mean-variance preferences or normal re-
turns, the CAPM pricing formula often provides a very good prediction for actual equilib-
rium returns. These results lead us to conjecture that the CAPM is robust with respect
to variation in preferences as long as preferences, dividends and endowments in the model
are realistically calibrated to annual US data.
We do not provide a theoretical justication for this claim but instead compute hundreds
of examples which illustrate it (see Judd (1997) for a general discussion which favors this
approach to economic theory) - we approximate equilibria numerically and compare the
prices and portfolio-holdings predicted by the CAPM to the actual equilibrium prices and
equilibrium portfolio-holdings.
In order to compute equilibria when asset markets are incomplete, we develop a new
algorithm which diers from existing ones (see Brown, DeMarzo and Eaves (1996) and
Schmedders (1998)), in that it focuses on the two-period model with a single good. This
1Chamberlain (1983) and Owen and Rabinovitch (1983) prove that under general preferences one has
to assume that all asset returns are multivariate elliptically distributed.
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limitation enables us to take advantage of the special structure of the one-good model
and to operate in portfolio space instead of in the state space. Therefore the number of
unknowns does not increase as the state space increases and we can approximate continuous
distributions in very large discrete state-spaces.
To show that the CAPM pricing formula provides a good approximation to asset returns
in realistically calibrated models, one rst has to clarify what one means by 'realistically
calibrated'. We follow the macroeconomic literature and we choose rst and second mo-
ments of endowments and dividends to match annual US data and preferences to exhibit
relative risk aversion below 10 and nonincreasing absolute risk aversion (see e.g. Mehra
and Prescott (1985))2.
More importantly one has to argue that the computed examples are not sensitive to
the exact specication of the model but that they reect some general property of asset
prices. We assume that there are three agents and 32; 768 states of nature and we examine
the robustness of the CAPM with respect to 600 dierent specications of preferences and
endowments. We rst assume that endowments and dividends are log-normally distributed
and consider the following 3 specications for preferences.
 All three agents have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility functions.
 All agents' utility functions exhibit constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
 Agents' utility-functions exhibit loss aversion as in Benartzi and Thaler (1995).
For each case we randomly generate 100 economies which dier with respect to agents'
(heterogeneous) degrees of risk aversion.
In the next three cases we x preferences and vary distributions of dividends and
endowments. We assume that all agents have CRRA utility functions and consider the
following distributions for assets and endowments.
 Endowments and dividends are drawn from a uniform distribution. We random-
ly generate 100 economies with dier with respect to the support of the uniform
distributions.
 Endowments and dividends are determined by two factors and an idiosyncratic shock
each of which are drawn from a log-normal distribution. We randomly generate 100
economies with dier with respect to the factor-loads.
 Endowments and dividends are drawn from a log-normal distribution and there is an
option on one of the stocks. We randomly generate 100 economies which dier with
respect to the strike-price of the option.
2Note that just as in Mehra and Prescott this calibration is very unrealistic with respect to the market
risk-premium. This fact might give a rst indication of why CAPM-pricing does so well in our framework.
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For all 600 economies under consideration we compare the computed return on indi-
vidual stocks to the return predicted by the CAPM-pricing formula. We nd that in all
600 cases the average mean squared pricing errors (for returns) across stocks lie below 0.04
percent. The average error across all simulations is in the order of magnitude of 0.005
percent. We also develop an R2-measure to assess the validity of CAPM-pricing. The
value of it is well above 0.9999 in all economies examined by us.
In addition to predicting asset returns, the CAPM also predicts that all agents' equilib-
rium portfolio-holdings will consist of the riskless bond and a mutual fund of risky assets.
It is possible that CAPM-pricing is very accurate, but two-fund separation does not apply.
Nevertheless, in the computed examples two-fund separation holds almost exactly in the e-
quilibria we compute. The R2-statistic we use to judge the presence of two-fund separation
exceeds 0.99 in the vast majority of cases considered.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a short introduction to the
model and collect several general results on the CAPM in a general equilibrium setting.
Section 3 gives an example of a realistically calibrated economy with non-elliptical returns
and CRRA preferences for which CAPM-pricing provides an almost perfect prediction. In
Sections 4 and 5 we examine the robustness of this phenomenon. In Section 4 we vary the
parameters of risk aversion for the CRRA case, we consider CARA utility functions, and
we examine utility functions displaying loss aversion. In Section 5 we x preferences to
exhibit constant relative risk aversion and we examine the robustness of the CAPM with
respect to dividend-distributions. In Section 6 we speculate about possible explanations
and conclude the main part of the paper. In the Appendix we describe the algorithm and
prove its global convergence.
2 The Two-Period Finance Economy
The nance version of the GEI-model describes an economy over two periods of time,
t = 0; 1; with uncertainty over the state of nature resolving in period t = 1. We describe the
model, introduce the necessary notation and discuss the CAPM. For a thorough description
of the GEI-model see for example Magill and Quinzii (1996).
2.1 The Model
There are S + 1 states in the economy; at time t = 0 the economy is in state s = 0; at
time t = 1 one state of nature s out of S possible states of nature realizes. In each state
s = 0; : : : ; S; there is a single nondurable consumption good.
There are H agents, indexed by h = 1; : : : ;H; that participate in the economy. Agent h
is characterized by initial endowments (the initial income stream) eh = (eh0; e
h




int(Xh)3 and his preferences over consumption bundles (income streams available for con-
3int(Xh) denotes the interior of Xh:
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sumption) ch = (ch0 ; c
h
1; : : : ; c
h
S)
> 2 Xh. Here Xh is a closed subset of IRS+1 that satises
fxhg + IRS+1+  Xh for all xh 2 Xh: In most applications Xh will be equal to IRS+1+
or IRS+1: To distinguish between rst-period consumption and the random second period
consumption, we dene ex = (x1; : : : ; xS)> for any vector x = (x0; x1; : : : ; xS)>. Aggregate
endowments (aggregate incomes) are e =
PH
h=1 e
h: Each agents' preferences are represented
by a utility function uh : Xh ! IR satisfying standard assumptions; uh is strictly quasi-
concave and continuous. Moreover, the set Xh(eh) = fxh 2 Xh j uh(xh)  uh(eh)g is
assumed to be bounded from below, a property automatically satised when Xh is bound-
ed from below. In the applications of Sections 3 5 we consider economies where all agents
have separable utility functions across date-events with identical probabilities, i.e. there
exist probabilities 1; : : : ; S > 0;
PS
s=1 s = 1, such that















s ; where X
h
s is a subset of IR; and
vhs : X
h
s ! IR is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave. In this case it follows
from the properties of vhs that X
h(eh) is bounded from below. When the functions vhs are
independent of s; we say that agents have von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions.
There are J assets. Asset j pays dividends at date t = 1 which we denote by dj 2 IRS :
The price of asset j at time t = 0 is qj. Without loss of generality we assume that the
assets are in zero net supply and we collect all assets' dividends in a pay-o matrix
A = (d1; ::::; dJ) 2 IRSJ :
At time t = 0 agent h chooses a portfolio-holding h 2 IRJ which uniquely denes the
agents' consumption by ch0 = e
h
0   h  q and ech = eh + Ah. The net demand of agent h;ech   eh; belongs to the marketed subspace hAi = fz 2 IRS j 9 2 IRJ ; z = Ag:
The exogenous parameters dening a nance economy E = ((Xh; uh; eh)h=1;:::;H;A)
are agents' consumption sets, utility functions and endowments, and the pay-o matrix.
Without loss of generality, we assume throughout that there are no redundant assets,
rank(A) = J: If there are redundant assets, it follows from an arbitrage argument that
their price is uniquely determined by the price of the other assets. Markets are incomplete
when J < S. We dene asset prices to be arbitrage free if it is not possible to achieve a
positive income stream in all states by trading in the available assets. It is well known that
a price system q 2 IRJ precludes arbitrage if and only if there exists a state price vector
 2 IRS++ such that q = >A. We dene Q to be the set of arbitrage free asset prices.
Definition 2.1 (Competitive Equilibrium): A competitive equilibrium for an
economy E is a collection of portfolio-holdings  = (1; : : : ; H) 2 IRHJ and asset prices
q 2 IRJ that satisfy the following conditions:










Under an additional assumption of strictly increasing utility functions, existence of an
equilibrium follows from the results of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986).
2.2 The Capital Asset Pricing Model
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) use the portfolio analysis developed by Tobin (1958)
and Markowitz (1959) to examine an equilibrium model of nancial markets. Under the
assumption that all agents are mean-variance optimizers, and given the riskfree rate of
return and the return of the market portfolio, they derive a closed-form solution for e-
quilibrium returns of all assets, the so-called -pricing formula. This formula relates the
return of a risky asset to the return of the market portfolio by the covariance of that asset
with the market. It is well known that the -pricing formula can be derived in the nance
GEI-model, see Geanakoplos and Shubik (1990). To x notation and to give some intuition
for the computational results in Sections 3   5; we summarize and slightly generalize the
ndings in the literature - Geanakoplos and Shubik (1990), Magill and Quinzii (1996), Oh
(1996), and Willen (1997) - to cover the case with mean-variance preferences, non-marketed
endowments and a nite state space in a world with incomplete markets.
We denote by 1n = (1; : : : ; 1)> 2 IRn the vector of all ones. The m-th unit vector of
appropriate dimension is denoted m - the dimension of m is always apparent from the
context. Throughout this subsection we assume that there exist objective probabilities s;
s = 1; : : : ; S; over the possible states of nature in period 1: Moreover, asset 1 is a riskless
bond, d1 = 1S . For a random variable x 2 IRS; we dene its expected value E(x) =PS
s=1 sxs, for two random variables x; y 2 IRS; we dene the covariance as cov(x; y) =PS
s=1 sxsys   E(x)E(y): The variance of a random variable x 2 IRS is given by var(x) =
cov(x; x). Finally, we dene x  y = PSs=1 sxsys for vectors x; y 2 IRS.
For any competitive equilibrium (; q); there exists a unique state price vector in the
marketed subspace A 2 hAi such that, for all assets j; qj = A  dj: Using the denitions




j) + cov(A; d
j): (1)
We dene the return of a portfolio  2 IRJ with q   6= 0 by r = Aq and we denote the




E(dj) + cov(A; d
j):






q  A = A  AA = A  A > 0;
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where A 6= 0 follows from E(A) = q1 > 0:

























While equation (2) relates the prices of the risky assets and looks similar to the CAPM
pricing formula, this equation is rather useless if we have no further information on A.
Note that so far all formulas followed simply from the absence of arbitrage. It is well known
that under the assumption that at least one agent h's utility functions is dierentiable and
that in an equilibriumwith individual consumption (ch)h2H , agent h's utility maximization














where projhAi denotes the projection on hAi under the inner product .
One possibility to derive an interesting pricing formula is to assume that all preferences
just depend on the mean and the variance of consumption,
uh(ch) = wh(ch0;E(ech); var(ech));
where wh is strictly increasing in ch0 and in the expected consumption and strictly decreasing
in the variance of consumption.
Agent h's rst period endowments can be decomposed into a marketed part and a non-
marketed part, where the latter part lies orthogonal to the marketed subspace under the
inner product : We write
eh = ehM + eh?
and have by denition eh?  z = 0 for all z 2 hAi. This decomposition is uniquely deter-
mined. We dene the marketed endowments eM = PHh=1 ehM and the market portfolio M
as the unique portfolio satisfying
AM = eM:
Note that it may happen that q  M = 0; even when e 0:5
To simplify matters, we rst assume q  M 6= 0 and then argue that this assumption is






4The assumption of smooth preferences we make in the appendix ensures that we always have interior
solutions.
5For a vector x 2 IRm we use the notation x  0 if x 2 IRm+ ; x > 0 if x 2 IR
m
+ n f0g; and x  0 if
x 2 IRm++:
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Then we have the following result.
Theorem 2.3: Under the assumptions that all agents maximize mean-variance utili-
ty functions with objective probabilities ; var(eM) > 0, and there is a riskless bond, each
equilibrium (; q) of E with equilibrium consumption (c1; : : : ; cH) has the following prop-
erties.
1. The CAPM-pricing formula holds; when q  M 6= 0; then for each  2 IRJ ;
E(r) Rf = (E(rM) Rf): (3)
2. Two-fund separation holds; for each agent h there exists (h1; 
h
2) 2 IR  IR+; wherePH
h=1 
h




2 = 1; such that
ech   eh? = h11S + h2AM:
3. The pricing vector satises A = 11S   2eM; with 1 > 2E(e) and 2 strictly
positive.
Proof. We rst show that a pseudo two-fund separation holds in the sense that the
agents' consumption bundles can be written as ech = eh?+ eh11S+ eh2A for some eh1 ; eh2 2 IR.
Dene
ech = eh? + projh1S;Ai(ech):
Suppose pseudo two-fund separation does not hold, so ech 6= ech. Since A  (ech   ech) = 0;
it follows that the portfolios needed to consume ech and ech are as expensive at date 0.
Moreover, eh?  (ech   ech) = 0 and 1S  (ech   ech) = 0; so it follows that E(ech   ech) = 0
and cov(ech   ech; ech) = 0: Therefore, E(ech) = E(ech) and var(ech) > var(ech); giving a
contradiction to the optimality of ech at prices q: We obtain pseudo two-fund separation.
Since in equilibrium eM = PHh=1(ech   eh?), the two-fund separation property implies
that eM 2 h1S ; Ai. The assumption var(eM) > 0 implies that eM is not collinear to 1S
and it holds that A = 11S  2eM for some numbers 1; 2: Two-fund separation follows
immediately, ech   eh? = h11S + h2AM for some numbers h1; h2 :
Since eM = PHh=1 h11S + PHh=1 h2 eM and var(eM) > 0; we have PHh=1 h1 = 0 andPH
h=1 
h
2 = 1: Consider a consumption bundle c
h
  that results from using the income that
is invested in the market portfolio to buy the riskless bond, so ech  = eh? + h11S + h2(A 
AM=q

1)1S : The portfolios needed to consume ech and ech  are as expensive since A  (ech ech ) = 0: Since var(ech )  var(ech) and uh(ch )  uh(ch); it holds that E(ech )   E(ech) =
 (h22=q1)var(eM)  0; where we use that AAM = q1E(eM) 2var(eM): The preceding
inequalities are strict inequalities when h2 > 0; which is the case for at least one agent.
Then it follows that 2 > 0 and h2  0; h = 1; : : : ;H: Since 0 < q1 = E(A) = 1  
2E(eM); and 1S  e? = 0; so E(eM) = E(e); it holds that 1 > 2E(e):
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 2q  M +





We assume in the theorem that var(eM) > 0: The theorem also holds true for the
degenerate case where eM is collinear to 1S , but since the proof of this simple fact is rather
tedious it is omitted.
Note that for the case where the endowments are spanned, i.e. where eh? = 0 for all
h; the pricing formula reduces to the standard CAPM-formula (see Magill and Quinzii
(1996)).
It might be sensible to dene the market portfolio somewhat dierently as a portfolio
of risky assets only. This claries the concept of two-fund separation, since then one
fund consists of risky assets only. In this case dene bM = (0; M,2; : : : ; M;J): If we deneb = cov(r; rbM)=var(rbM) it turns out that the pricing formula still holds. After some
substitutions, one obtains
E(r) Rf = b(E(rbM) Rf):
Even more generally, dene the market portfolio eM as an arbitrary combination of a
portfolio consisting of the riskless asset only and the portfolio bM; so
eM = 11 + 2bM;
where 2 6= 0: Then it holds that A = e11   e2eM; where e2 6= 0: If we dene e =
cov(r; reM)=var(reM); then
E(r) Rf = e(E(reM) Rf):
The proof is identical to the one of Theorem 2.3, when 1; 2; and M are substituted bye1; e2; and eM: This result also oers a way out when q  M = 0: One may simply useeM = M + "1 with " > 0 to derive the pricing formula. Indeed, q  eM = "q1 > 0:
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The version of two-fund separation we consider in Theorem 2.3 is slightly more general
than the usual one, where it is assumed that the initial income stream eh of every agent is
marketed. As a consequence one obtains the formula
ech = h11S + h2 e
when endowments are marketed. In the more general case considered in Theorem 2.3, the
nal income stream consumed by each agent consists not only of the returns of a linear
combination of the riskless bond and the market portfolio, but also of the undiversiable
non-marketed individual part of the initial income stream, eh?:
Finally, note that the concept of marketed endowments is not needed to dene the
pricing vector. Since e? is orthogonal to hAi; the pricing vector can also be dened byeA = 11S   2e: Of course it no longer holds that eA 2 hAi: Moreover, income streams
not in hAi are typically priced dierently by eA than by A:
As we have discussed in the introduction, Theorem 2.3 can only be obtained when one
is willing to make very restrictive assumptions. As Magill and Quinzii (1996) put it when
commenting on representative agent models and the CAPM: \As we indicated above these
models are interesting since they lead to clearcut results which have strong intuitive appeal.
However the restrictive nature of the hypothesis made could cast doubt on the generality
of the results." The important question we want to address is how much actual equilibrium
prices and actual portfolio-holdings in a general setting will dier from the predictions of
the CAPM.
3 The CAPMWithout Mean-Variance Preferences
The assumption that all agents maximize a quadratic utility function is unattractive be-
cause it implies increasing absolute risk aversion. A more realistic assumption, and one
commonly made in macroeconomics and nance, is that agents' preferences exhibit con-
stant relative risk aversion. It is clear, however, that with these preferences agents' will
care about higher moments and that therefore a mean-variance analysis is not valid. The
following example shows that a mean-variance utility function does not even serve as a
good approximation of a constant relative risk aversion utility function.




s = 1=3; s = 1; 2; 3; and vh(chs ) =  1=3(chs ) 3; which corresponds to a utility function
with constant relative risk aversion equal to 4: For simplicity we assume that the household
has no income at t = 0 and does not derive utility from consumption in that period. Con-
sider the consumption of two income streams, (0:8; 0:8; 1:4) and (0:6; 1:2; 1:2); that have
the same mean and variance. Any mean-variance utility function should therefore consider
both income streams as being equally good. When an agent has a constant relative risk
aversion utility function, the second income stream is less preferred, as the income in the
rst state is 40% lower than average income, whereas the income at the bad states of the
10
rst income stream are only 20% below average income, uh(0:8; 0:8; 1:4) =  0:475 and
uh(0:6; 1:2; 1:2) =  0:643: Even if for the second income prole, income is increased by
10% in every state, we get uh(0:66; 1:32; 1:32) =  0:483; so it would still be inferior to
the income stream (0:8; 0:8; 1:4): This phenomenon becomes even more severe when two
income streams with the same, higher variance are compared or when a more risk averse
agent is considered.
A standard way to calibrate equilibrium models under uncertainty is to assume that
there are several uncorrelated shocks and to choose the magnitude of the shocks to match
aggregate rst and second moments. From now on we examine an economy with three
heterogeneous agents, representing classes of agents with low, medium and high incomes.
Each agent is endowed with an initial portfolio (0; h ) of the riskless bond and the
available stocks,6 with current income, representing current labor income plus dividends
from h ; e
1
0 = 2=3; e
2
0 = 1; and e
3
0 = 4=3; and with stochastic future labor income given by
some lh 2 IRS++: We are back in the framework of Section 2 by setting e10 = 2=3, e20 = 1
and e30 = 4=3; and eh = lh +PJj=2 h jdj for h = 1; :::;H. For each household h; the labor
incomes lhs are generated by S independent draws from some given distribution. In this
way we can obtain a discrete approximation of any continuous distribution.
The rst agent has no capital income, 1  = 0: For the other agents we have 
2
  =
1=3  1J 1 and 3  = 2=3  1J 1. In most applications agents have heterogeneous von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions with identical uniform probabilities over states
and identical discount factors h = 0:95.
The assets available are given by a riskless bond and seven stocks. In most examples the
dividends of asset j depend on a single common factor f 2 IRS as well as on an idiosyncratic
shock "j 2 IRS . We denote asset j's load in the factor by cj, varying from 0:25 to 1:75
in steps of 0:25. The examples are calibrated to yearly US data. The expected growth
rate of aggregate consumption equals two percent and the standard deviation of both the
factor and the idiosyncratic shock determining the dividends are about 0:13 - giving an
overall standard deviation of the stock market of about 0:17. The standard deviation of
labor income is chosen to be around 0:10 and labor income constitutes around 2=3 of total
income. The eleven random variables in the model are therefore ((lh)h=1;:::;H; f; ("
j)j=2;:::;J).
As a rst example we analyze the case where the realization of each random variable
is either high or low with equal probabilities, and all random variables are independent.
The minimal state space to achieve this consists of 211 = 2; 048 states. More specically
we have that
lhs 2 f2=3  (1:02  0:1); 2=3  (1:02 + 0:1)g;
fs 2 f 0:13; 0:13g;
"js 2 f 0:13; 0:13g:
6Note that contrary to the model described in Section 2, we assume now that stocks are in unit net
supply.
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Dividends of asset j are then determined by









1   h ; c
h
s > 0;
where h is the coecient of relative risk aversion. We choose 1 = 6; 2 = 4 and 3 = 2:
This specication completes the description of the economy E: We compute the equi-
librium prices and portfolio-holdings and compare them to the predictions of the CAPM
in Figure 1. To do those computations, we could in principle use the homotopy algorithms
as reported in Brown, DeMarzo and Eaves (1996) or Schmedders (1998), which can solve
for an equilibrium in the general multiple commodities GEI-model. The problem is that
for both algorithms the number of equations to be solved is a multiple of the number of
states, whereas the number of states is 1,024 for the current economy and 32,768 for the
other economies considered in this paper. This makes both algorithms unsuitable for our
purposes. In the appendix we develop an algorithm that is tailored to the nance GEI-
model with one good per state, and that is independent of the number of states. Instead,
the number of equations to be solved is related to the number of assets, which is 8 for most
economies analyzed in this paper. The specics of the algorithm, as well as a proof of its
global convergence, are treated in detail in the appendix.
The solid line in Figure 1 is the security market line, i.e. the CAPM relationship between
a portfolio's  and its risk premium. The actual equilibrium expected returns of the seven
securities are depicted by + and lie all almost exactly on the security market line. The
CAPM turns out to be an extraordinarily good predictor for the actual equilibrium returns
of assets in this example. This is surprising as preferences are far from mean-variance, and
asset returns are far from being normally distributed.
Although the graph of Figure 1 looks very convincing, it is clear that we need more
objective measures to quantify the deviation of equilibrium prices and portfolio-holdings
from the CAPM predictions. Note that we need to check both the robustness of two-fund
separation and the robustness of the pricing-formula. With general preferences CAPM-
pricing is neither necessary nor sucient for two-fund separation. It is easy to see that two-
fund separation does not imply CAPM-pricing. Consider a model with complete markets
where all agents have identical constant absolute risk aversion preferences. It is well known
that two-fund separation holds since there exists a linear sharing rule, see also Cass and
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Figure 1: Security market line with high-low returns.
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Conversely, suppose prices of assets consistent with CAPM-pricing are given, and let asset
markets be complete for simplicity. It is easy to choose individual consumption bundles
which do not belong to h1S ; ei and utility functions for which the individual consumption
bundles are optimal at the asset prices chosen.
The most straightforward approach to measure the accuracy of CAPM-pricing is to







where rj denotes the equilibrium expected return of asset j and brj the prediction by the
CAPM.
A dierent approach consists of the following. By the arguments used in the proof
of Theorem 2.3 it is obvious that A 2 h1S ; eMi is sucient for CAPM-pricing. That
this is necessary as well follows from the observation that otherwise A is equal to the
sum of its projection on h1S ; eMi plus a non-zero orthogonal part in hAi under the inner
product :When CAPM-pricing is valid, the orthogonal part should have zero price, which
is obviously not the case when priced by A: Therefore, an interesting alternative to MSE














as regressand and 1S and eM as regressors. Notice that this measure is independent of h:
We call it Pricing R2:
To measure how well two-fund separation holds for agent h; we take the OLS R2 of the
regression with (hj )j=2;:::;J as regressand and
bM; the risky part of the market portfolio,
as regressor.
The following table conrms that the CAPM provides an outstanding prediction for





Two-fund R2 h = 1 0.9999988
Two-fund R2 h = 2 0.9999994
Two-fund R2 h = 3 0.9999998
Table 1: The CAPM for CRRA preferences and two-point distributions.
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Although the high-low specications for the random variables are two-point approxima-
tions to normal random variables, the well-known fact that the CAPM holds with normally
distributed returns does not imply anything about the validity of the CAPM in this frame-
work. It is easy to see that two-point approximations to normal random variables do not
satisfy the properties of elliptical distributions. The following trivial example shows that
while each dividends distribution is characterized by its mean and variance it is not true
that a linear combination of these random variables is also fully characterized by its mean
and variance.














Both d1 and d2 are discrete distributions such that with probability 1=2 the realization is
 0:5 and with probability 1=2 the realization is 0:5: However, both d1+ d2 and p2d1 have
expectation zero and variance 1=2; but correspond to dierent distributions and dierent
utilities when the utility function is not mean-variance.
One should not expect the CAPM to hold in this model even though the distributions
provide a (very crude) approximation to normal distributions.
Also the fact that two-fund separation holds so well, comes as a surprise. Since the
households we are dealing with have dierent parameters of relative risk aversion, there
is no reason to expect that two fund separation obtains, see Cass and Stiglitz (1970) and
Detemple and Gottardi (1998).
4 Robustness in Preferences
In order to show that the predictions of the CAPM are a good approximation for equilibria
in a wide variety of economic settings we compute 600 examples. To avoid the suspicion
that high-low shocks are close substitutes to normal shocks, which might explain the results,
we use log-normally distributed shocks throughout this section. We assume that there are
S = 32; 768 states of nature. Using a large number of states guarantees that our nal
samples are good approximations of continuous distributions. By taking a large number
of states we rule out nite sample eects on the prices of assets. When we replicate the
experiment and generate economies out of a newly drawn sample, the equilibrium will be
almost the same if the number of states is suciently large.
The assumption that all random variables are log-normally distributed means that
lhs ; fs; and "
j
s are drawn independently from a log-normal distribution. The log-normal
distribution with mean  and variance 2 is denoted by LN(; 2): Since we are considering
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nite samples, the drawing will be of (some) inuence on the equilibrium we compute. As
before asset 1 is the riskless bond. For j  2; we dene asset j's dividend to be
djs = 1=7  1:02  f js  "js
and we choose
lhs  LN(2=3  1:02; (2=3)2  0:01);
f js  LN(1; cj  0:0161);
"js  LN(1; 0:0161):
The actual (f js )
J
j=2 are all based on a single realization of a normal random variable
bfs: For
each asset j; we linearly transform the realization of this random variable in such a way
that after taking the exponent a log-normally distributed random variable with mean 1
and variance cj  0:0161 results. The construction of the random variables implies that all
dividends themselves are log-normally distributed. To get a similar variance of the entire
stock market as before the variance of the factors and the idiosyncratic shock have to be
chosen to be 0:0161 instead of 0:0169. Notice that the factor realization does not enter
linearly in the formula for the asset's dividends, an assumption that is made in most models
describing factor economies. This is an additional advantage as it puts the CAPM only
more seriously to the robustness test. Finally, it follows from the work of Feldstein (1969)
that log-normal distributions do not belong to the elliptic class, and would not admit of
two-fund separation.
We consider three dierent families of utility functions and compute one hundred ran-
domly generated examples within each class. For each class we report histograms of the
MSE, the Pricing R2; and the Two-fund R2 of agents 2 and 3. By market clearing, the
portfolio-holdings of agent 1 are fully dependent on those of agents 2 and 3. If two-fund
separation holds exactly for agents 2 and 3 it will hold exactly for agent 1 as well. There-
fore, we safe space and do not report the Two-fund R2 of agent 1. In all histograms the
scaling is taken identically, so that results for dierent models can be compared easily.
We rst assume that all agents' utility functions exhibit constant absolute risk aversion,
i.e.
vh(chs ) =   exp(hchs ); chs 2 IR;
where h is the coecient of absolute risk aversion. We then move on and examine an




1  h ; c
h
s > 0; 
h 6= 1;




s > 0; 
h = 1;
where h is the coecient of relative risk aversion.
The rationale for examining both constant absolute risk aversion and constant relative
risk aversion is as follows. Kenneth Arrow has repeatedly argued that it is realistic to
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assume increasing relative risk aversion and non-increasing absolute risk aversion. By cov-
ering the two extreme cases of constant absolute and constant relative risk aversion we want
to argue that the CAPM provides a good approximation for pricing for all specications
which satisfy Arrow's criteria.
We end this section by assuming that agents have utility functions with loss aversion,
for the specics see Subsection 4.3. The analysis of that case shows that the assumption
of expected utility maximization is not essential for the CAPM to be a valuable tool.
4.1 Random CARA
We randomly generate 100 examples of economies where all agents have constant absolute
risk aversion. For each example we draw the coecient of risk aversion h, h = 1; 2; 3;
from a uniform distribution on the interval [0:5; 10]: Comparisons between the computed
equilibria and the CAPM predictions are depicted in the histograms of Figures 2a-d.7
Obviously the CAPM predicts extremely well. The mean squared error always lies
below 0:04 percent. In most cases it is around 0:5  10 4: The Pricing R2 exceeds 0:9999
in all examples. The Two-fund R2 exceeds 0:99 in most cases. Compared to the single
example examined in Section 3, the results are slightly worse on average. Figure 3 claries
that this can be entirely explained by higher values for the average rate of risk aversion
present in the economy. The MSE increases with average risk aversion in the economy, as
measured by the harmonic mean of the h's (it is well known that the harmonic mean is
the right measure for average risk aversion in an economy where all agents have constant
absolute risk aversion).
Although the CAPM remains an excellent predictor for all cases examined so far, Fig-
ure 3 indicates that the CAPM is a better tool in environments with lower average risk
aversion. In the light of this result one might be tempted to draw a parallel between our re-
sults and the observation of Mehra and Prescott (1985) that realistic values of risk-aversion
do not produce a realistic equilibrium risk-premium. If the equilibrium returns of risky
assets do not change signicantly with small variations of agents' coecient of relative
risk aversion it can be expected that the cross-section remains almost unchanged and that
the CAPM (which predicts excess returns independently of preferences) provides a good
prediction for a variety of attitudes towards risk. Note, however, that this can only explain
one side of the phenomena - the question remains why the cross-section of returns can be
described by the assets' 's.
4.2 Random CRRA
We now assume that all agents have constant relative risk aversion and we draw h, h =
1; 2; 3; from a uniform distribution on the interval [0:5; 10]: With mean household income
equal to 1; the degree of risk-aversion in the economy is similar to the CRRA-case examined
7The Pricing R2 is multiplied by 100 to avoid round-o to 1.000 by our software.
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Figure 2a: CARA: MSE.












Figure 2b: CARA: 100 Pricing R2:










Figure 2c: CARA: Two-fund
separation agent 2.









Figure 2d: CARA: Two-fund
separation agent 3.
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Figure 3: MSE against Risk-Aversion for CARA preferences.
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in Subsection 4.1. As before we compute 100 examples - Figures 4a-d report the analogues
of Figures 2a-d for the CRRA case.
Figure 4 shows that the CAPM is an excellent predictor for the class of CRRA utility
functions, both in terms of pricing and in terms of two-fund separation. In most cases
MSE is around 1  10 4: The worst Pricing R2 found is 0:99995 and the worst Two-fund
R2 is 0:95:
The high values of the Pricing R2 provides very useful information for the pricing of
assets. Recall that the price of asset j is given by A  dj = A  dj=S: Any vector that
is highly correlated with A should lead to a similar price for asset j: In particular, when
the Pricing R2 is close to one, the CAPM is bound to give almost exact equilibrium prices
and the use of the CAPM leads to a low MSE.
4.3 Loss Aversion
To demonstrate that our results do not depend on state independent utility, we analyze
a class of utility functions that are state dependent and that are characterized by loss
aversion. Such utility functions get support from empirical work on the decision making
of agents. They are also claimed to be helpful in explaining the equity premium puzzle of
Mehra and Prescott (1985), see Benartzi and Thaler (1995).
We cannot use exactly the same utility functions as Benartzi and Thaler, as these are
not everywhere quasi-concave, and as a consequence a competitive equilibrium may not
exist. The important characteristic of loss-aversion is not so much the existence of non-
concavities, but a sharp decrease in utility when loosing income compared to the status
quo and only a mild increase in utility when gaining income. This is usually modeled by
a utility function that has a kink at the status quo.
We generate a utility function with loss aversion as follows. We identify the status quo
of an agent h in state s  1 with ehs : Then loss aversion applies to making good or bad
investment decisions on the stock market. Consistent with Benartzi and Thaler (1995),
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Figure 4a: CRRA: MSE.













Figure 4b: CRRA: 100 Pricing R2:









Figure 4c: CRRA: Two-fund
separation agent 2.









Figure 4d: CRRA: Two-fund
separation agent 3.
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The Bernoulli function vhs is continuous and is continuously dierentiable except at e
h
s
where it has a kink. It can be shown that the coecient of relative risk aversion varies
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chs  ehs , so it approaches h2 as chs ! 0: The coecient of relative risk aversion is given by
h1 if c
h
s  ehs .
Since vhs is not dierentiable at e
h
s it does not satisfy the assumptions under which the
algorithm has been shown to be convergent. We have to smooth out the kinks of the utility
function. We can do this by taking any eh s ; e
h+




















In principle, the parameter ks has to be adjusted to make vhs continuous. Since our algo-
rithmworks entirely with rst order conditions, this is of no concern to us. In the numerical











and we draw h2 , h = 1; 2; 3; from a uniform distribution on the interval [1; 6]. In this way
one hundred economies are randomly generated. The outcomes of our computations are
presented in Figures 5a-d.
It turns out that the CAPM is an extraordinarily good predictor for the case with
loss aversion. The results seem to be even better than for the CARA and CRRA cases
examined before. In most cases, MSE is below 1  10 4; Pricing R2 exceeds 0:99999; and
the Two-fund R2 exceeds 0:98: If we take into account that the examples with loss aversion
are such that the degree of risk aversion is lower on average than before, the Pricing R2 is
comparable to the one found for CRRA and CARA preferences.
5 Robustness in Return Processes
We now x agents' preferences to exhibit constant relative risk aversion and choose 1 = 6;
2 = 4; and 3 = 2: We test the robustness of our results to variations in the distributions
of endowments and assets. We consider three dierent families of return processes and
compute 100 randomly generated examples within each class. We show the histograms of
MSE, Pricing R2; and Two-fund R2 of agents 2 and 3.
5.1 Uniform Returns
In order to verify whether our results depend on the assumption of log-normal shocks, we
now assume that all shocks are uniformly distributed. We also allow for some variation in
the ratio of labor income to total income, in the variance of the factor and in the variance
of the idiosyncratic shocks.
We start each example by randomly generating parameters a1; a2; a3 and a4; where
a1  U(1:02  0:5; 1:02  0:9);
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Figure 5a: LA: MSE.








Figure 5b: LA: 100 Pricing R2:











Figure 5c: LA: Two-fund
separation agent 2.












Figure 5d: LA: Two-fund
separation agent 3.
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a2  U(1:02  1:1; 1:02  1:5);
a3  U( 0:5; 0:1);
a4  U(0:1; 0:5):
Given a realization for a1; : : : ; a4; we continue the construction of the economy by taking
independent drawings for lhs ; fs and "
j
s; where
lhs  U(2=3  0:8; 2=3  1:24);
fs  U((a1   a2)=2; (a2   a1)=2);
"js  U(a3; a4):
Finally, dividends are determined by








Given the realizations for the parameters a1 and a2; 1=7  (a1 + a2)=2 equals expected
dividends from asset j: The realization of the factor belongs to the interval [(a1 a2)=2; (a2 
a1)=2] and the realizations of the idiosyncratic shocks to the interval [a3; a4]: The expected
labor income and the variance of labor income are as before.
Figures 6a-d show that the ability of the CAPM to predict portfolio-holdings and excess
returns is robust to the exact specication of the distribution of shocks. The results are very
close to the ones obtained for the base case with log-normal shocks examined in Section 3,
where the average degree of risk aversion in the economy is similar.
5.2 More Factors
One might wonder whether our results are not simply due to the fact that we have all
risky assets being inuenced by a single common factor. In fact, it is possible to derive the
CAPM as a special case of the APT where there is only one factor, see for instance Connor
(1984). However, such a derivation requires an uncountable number (or at least very large
number) of assets to diversify the idiosyncratic shocks away. The inuence of idiosyncratic
shocks is quite substantial in our economies with only seven risky assets. Moreover, usually
factors enter linearly in the denition of an asset's pay-o, which is not always the case in
our economies. It seems therefore not likely that our results are due to the single factor
set-up.
Other elements of the set-up we used so far are that factor loads are distributed very
symmetrically and balanced, and that the importance of idiosyncratic shocks is the same
for all assets. We drop these assumptions in the economies of this section. Finally, we
consider a wider range for the variance of the entire stock market.
In this subsection we generate a number of economies where risky assets depend on two
factors, f and bf; and factor loads for each one of the assets are randomly drawn. On top
of this, also the importance of the idiosyncratic shock is randomly determined.
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Figure 6a: Uniform: MSE.








Figure 6b: Uniform: 100 Pricing R2:










Figure 6c: Uniform: Two-fund
separation agent 2.








Figure 6d: Uniform: Two-fund
separation agent 3.
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We start each example by randomly generating, for each asset j = 2; : : : ; J; parameters
cj; bcj; and ij: These parameters represent the load in factor 1, the load in factor 2 and the
importance of the idiosyncratic shock. More specically it holds that
cj  U(0; 2);bcj  U(0; 2);
ij  U(0; 4):
Labor income, the two factors and assets' idiosyncratic shocks are independently log-
normally distributed, so lhs ; fs;
bfs; and "js are drawn from a log-normal distribution,
lhs  LN(2=3  1:02; (2=3)2  0:01);
f js  LN(1; cj  0:0161);bf js  LN(1; bcj  0:0161);
"js  LN(1; ij  0:0161):
Finally, dividends are determined by
djs = 1=7  1:02  f js  bf js  "js:
The way to generate f js ; j = 2; : : : ; J; from a single realization of a normally distributed
random variable is the same as in Section 4. The same applies to the other factor.
From Figure 7 we may conclude that the one factor framework is certainly not the
driving force that makes the CAPM work. Also in the two factor set-up, for a variety of
factor loads, with assets that are dierent in the importance of the idiosyncratic shocks,
the CAPM turns out to be an excellent model.
5.3 Options
Since markets are incomplete the introduction of an option on one of the assets will gener-
ally change all equilibrium prices (see Detemple and Selden (1991)). Therefore one might
expect that the introduction of an option worsens CAPM-pricing considerably. Further-
more, given the robustness of the CAPM in the earlier examples, it is interesting to see if
it is possible to give an equilibrium pricing formula for options in incomplete markets via
the CAPM.
Another reason to introduce an option is that this is an asset with the capacity to
seriously alter the higher order moments of an asset portfolio. One possible explanation
for our results obtained so far is that asset markets are very incomplete, which makes it
dicult for households to change the higher order moments of the returns of their portfolios.
Although households care for higher order moments, the mix of marketed assets makes it
dicult to aect the higher order moments. With the introduction of an option this clearly
changes. Agents have then a possibility to limit downwards risk, which is exactly the kind of
26









Figure 7a: Two-factor: MSE.








Figure 7b: Two-factor: 100 Pricing
R2:









Figure 7c: Two-factor: Two-fund
separation agent 2.










Figure 7d: Two-factor: Two-fund
separation agent 3.
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risk agents with CRRA utility functions are concerned about, but mean-variance optimizers
are not.
In order to investigate this issue more closely we introduce a call option on the most
risky asset. Specically we have a 9-th security which pays max(djs X; 0) in state s, with
X the strike price of the call option.
Suppose we consider the uniquely determined equilibrium pricing vector A of the
economy without the option, and we use this pricing vector to price the option. Given the
reasoning of the previous paragraph, at those prices one would expect the call option (in
combination with the bond) to be more attractive to the agents than the stock, exactly
because of the higher order moments. So the equilibrium price of the call option should be
higher than the one computed by CAPM-pricing, in order to make that asset less appealing.
As a consequence, the expected equilibrium return of the call option should be less than
the one predicted by the CAPM.
To examine dierent options, we draw X out of the uniform distribution for each
example. To avoid options that are either too far in or too far out of the money we
determine in each example the minimal dividend paid out by asset 8; d8 = mins=1;:::;S d8s;
and the maximal dividend paid out, d
8
= maxs=1;:::;S d8s : We then draw X out of a uniform
distribution on [0:5  (1:02 + d8); 0:5  (1:02 + d8)]: Note that 1:02 is the expected dividend
of asset 8. The strike price is always between the average of the minimal dividend and the
expected dividend, and the average of the expected dividend and the maximal dividend.
The results are given in Figures 8a-d.
The MSE in Figure 8 refers to the MSE of the pricing of the stocks only. The option
is analyzed in detail in Figure 9. It turns out that the MSE, and the Two-fund R2 are
comparable to the ones given before. The Pricing R2 is somewhat less good than before,
but is still excellent. Surprisingly, we have found no systematic eect of the introduction
of the option on the price of asset 8. In some examples the introduction of an option raised
the price above the CAPM-prediction, in others it has been lower.
Figure 9 analyzes the pricing of the option by the CAPM. According to the CAPM, a
call option is a very risky asset. It has zero pay-os in bad states of nature, and very high
in good states of nature. The covariance of a call option with the market portfolio is very
high, which is also clear from Figure 9, where it is shown that the option's  varied from
5 to 35 in the economies generated. Notice that, as we expected, there is indeed an over-
prediction of the expected return of an option by the CAPM. In all economies generated,
the CAPM underpriced the call option. The misprediction was relatively small when the
option's  is low, say below 10, but may get quite severe for call options with a very high
strike price, which are the ones with a high : Notice, however, that a higher  of an
option also corresponds to a higher excess return, which makes the relative misprediction
less bad. Still, the over-prediction of call option returns is more than linearly increasing in
an option's ; whereas the excess return itself is still roughly linear.
It is surprising that the Pricing R2 and the MSEs of stocks remained so good in all
economies, even when the option was sometimes seriously under-priced by the CAPM.
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Figure 8a: Option: MSE.












Figure 8b: Option: 100 Pricing R2:











Figure 8c: Option: Two-fund
separation agent 2.












Figure 8d: Option: Two-fund
separation agent 3.
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Figure 9: Option: over-prediction of return against option's :
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In fact, it may even be perceived as an inconsistency that the Pricing R2 is virtually
exactly correct, and the option is seriously mispriced. Indeed, when CAPM-pricing is
highly correlated with A; almost all assets are priced very well. The only exceptions are
those like options with a very high strike price. Such an asset pays o in a few (less than
10) states of the 32,768 only. A high correlation with A is not inconsistent with a fairly
dierent state price in a negligible fraction of states only.
6 Interpretation and Conclusion
In this paper we develop a new algorithm to compute equilibria in the nance version
of the GEI-model that is tailored to situations with a large state space. We use the
algorithm to examine the cross-section of stock returns with general preferences and general
specications of dividends, endowments and prices. We nd that the CAPM provides an
excellent approximation to equilibrium excess returns and portfolio-holdings for a wide
variety of preferences, dividends and endowments.
This result certainly does not conrm our intuition. In the CAPM-pricing formula,
excess returns only depend on the rst two moments of dividends and endowments, while
under general preferences agents care about all moments of the relevant distributions.
While the preferences we consider are in no way similar to mean-variance preferences,
nor are the endowments or dividends generated by elliptical distributions, the resulting
equilibrium portfolio-holdings and excess returns do not reect this fact at all.
In this paper we have generated over 600 economies, and the worst case has been a
Pricing R2 of 0:9999 and a Two-fund R2 of 0:95: Our current computational experience
suggests that the CAPM is an excellent tool to price assets in realistically calibrated
economies with incomplete markets. The results seem to be robust for a wide variety
of cases. The form of the utility functions, the distribution of the shocks, the number of
factors, and the introduction of options do not aect our results. We have heterogeneous
households, but their number, three, is too small to expect that nice structural properties
that tend to come out of aggregation in a heterogeneous economy, see Hildenbrand (1983,
1994) and Grandmont (1992), can explain our ndings. An explanation invoking the central
limit theorem does not apply either, as the total marketed risk in our economy is the sum
of only seven stocks that are for instance lognormally distributed. More importantly, each
possible linear combination of individual assets has to be priced correctly, in particular
each, for instance lognormally distributed, stock. The excellent performance of the CAPM
in all the economies generated therefore seems to be a puzzle.
Appendix: The Algorithm
In order to investigate the cross-sectional distribution of asset returns in more general
models we have to compute equilibria. In this section we develop a globally convergent
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algorithm to compute equilibria for the model introduced in Section 2. The presentation
of the algorithm, and the convergence proof, is simplied by restricting attention to an
economy without rst period consumption. From the arguments given in Geanakoplos
and Polemarchakis (1986) it follows that this is without loss of generality. Indeed, given
the pay-o matrix A of the previous section, if we dene the matrix A 2 IR(S+1)(J+1)
by A00 = 1; A0j = 0; j = 1; : : : ; J; As0 = 0; s = 1; : : : ; S; and Asj = Asj ; s = 1; : : : ; S;
j = 1; : : : ; J; then state 0 can be identied with the rst period, and purchasing one unit
of asset 0 corresponds to having one more unit of rst period consumption. In this section,
the index of assets runs from 0 to J:
We strengthen the assumptions made so far to Assumption A below, which states the
standard assumptions that are invoked when twice dierentiability of demand is required.
Assumption A1
1. Xh = IRS+1++ :
2. uh is three times continuously dierentiable, @uh(xh) 2 IRS+1++ for all xh 2 Xh (strong
monotonicity), y>@2uh(xh)y < 0 for all y 6= 0 such that @uh(xh)y = 0; for all xh 2 Xh
(negative Gaussian curvature), and fxh 2 IRS+1++ j uh(xh)  uh(xh)g is closed in IRS+1
for all xh 2 Xh (boundary condition).
3. eh 2 Xh:
4. rank(A) = J + 1 and there is  2 IRJ+1 such that A > 0:
A1(4) is actually weaker than the assumptions of Section 2, as it is clearly satised if
there is rst period consumption. All results of this section remain true, at the cost of
slightly more complicated proofs, when the assumption Xh = IRS+1++ is replaced by the
weaker assumption on consumption sets of Section 2, and the boundary condition in A1(2)
is modied accordingly.
Without loss of generality it can be assumed that asset 0 pays o a non-negative amount
in each state. Indeed, we can replace the original asset structure by taking A as asset 0
and deleting an asset j for which j 6= 0: Then it holds that q0 > 0 for all q 2 Q:
The following properties are useful when showing convergence of the algorithm. The
function G : Q! IRJ+1 denotes the total demand function for assets.
Lemma A.1: If the economy E satises Assumption A1, then the following properties
hold.
1. The function G : Q! IRJ+1 is twice continuously dierentiable.
2. For all q 2 Q; q G(q) = 0:
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3. If (qn)n2IN is a sequence in Q; qn ! q 2 @Q;8 q 6= 0; then for all bq 2 Q; bqG(qn)!1:
Proof. See Hens (1991). Q.E.D.
Let g0 : Q ! IRJ+1 be the excess demand function for assets of some articial agent
having a utility function and initial endowments satisfying Assumption A1. We will discuss
a sensible choice for this agent later on. Since Lemma A.1 also applies to an economy
consisting of just one agent, we obtain the properties of Lemma A.1 for g0:
The function g0 with component zero deleted is denoted by bg0; G with component zero
deleted is denoted by bG: We normalize prices by taking PJj=0(qj)2 = 1 and we propose to






t bG(q) + (1  t)bg0(q)
to compute equilibria in the nance GEI economy.
6.1 Generic Convergence
We are looking for solutions to H(t; q) = 0: If H(t; q) = 0; then q0 is positive and Lem-
ma A.1.2 implies tG0(q) + (1   t)g00(q) = 0; so tG(q) + (1   t)g0(q) = 0: In particular, if
t = 1; it follows that q is a competitive equilibrium price system.
A homotopy is in general constructed in such a way that there is a unique solution
to H(0; q) = 0; solutions to H(1; q) = 0 are solutions to the problem of interest, and the
unique solution to H(0; q) = 0 is linked by a path to one solution to H(1; q) = 0: By
following this path, which is feasible by several numerical techniques, a solution to the
problem of interest is found. When the unique solution to H(1; q) = 0 is indeed linked by
a path to a solution to H(1; q) = 0; then the homotopy is said to converge.
Theorem A.2 analyses the structure of the solutions to our homotopy.
Theorem A.2: Let E be an economy satisfying Assumption A1. Then, for an open
set of initial endowments with full Lebesgue measure,
 H 1(f0g) is a compact C2 1-dimensional manifold with boundary, with boundary
given by H 1(f0g) \ (f0; 1g Q):
 there is an odd number of solutions in H 1(f0g) \ (f1g  Q); i.e. there is an odd
number of competitive equilibria.
For any choice of initial endowments,
 there is one solution in H 1(f0g) \ (f0g Q);
8@Q represents the boundary of Q:
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 there is no sequence (tn; qn)n2IN in H 1(f0g) converging to (t; q) 2 [0; 1] @Q:
Proof. The only solution in H 1(f0g) \ (f0g Q) is obviously given by
(0; q0) = (0; @u0(e0)A=k@u0(e0)Ak2):
Suppose (tn; qn)n2IN is a sequence in H 1(f0g) converging to (t; q) 2 [0; 1] @Q: Then,
for q 2 Q;
0 = q  (tnG(qn) + (1  tn)g0(qn));
but
q  (tnG(qn) + (1  tn)g0(qn))!1
by Lemma A.1.3, a contradiction. Solutions to the homotopy equations stay away from
[0; 1] @Q: Now it also follows that H 1(f0g) is compact.
The proof is completed by showing that @qH(0; q); and, generic in initial endowments,
@qH(1; q); and @t;qH(t; q) have full rank for points in H 1(f0g):
It holds that g0(q) =  if and only if there is  6= 0 such that
@u0(e0 +A)A  q> = 0;
q   = 0:














where I denotes the (J + 1)-dimensional unit matrix. The rst matrix on the right-hand






It follows that y 6= 0; since otherwise y = 0 and A>@2u0(e0)Ay   qz = 0 implies z = 0;
contradicting (y; z) 6= 0: Since A has full column rank, Ay 6= 0: Moreover, @u0(e0)Ay =
q  y = 0; so the non-zero Gaussian curvature of u0 implies
0 = y>A
>




Consider (0; q0) 2 H 1(f0g)\ (f0gQ): Since 0(q0) 6= 0; (@qg0(q0); @q0(q0)) has rank
J +1; so @qg0(q0) has at least rank J: It follows that @qbg0(q0) has rank J; since q  g0(q) = 0
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0): Since homogeneity of
degree zero of g0 in asset prices implies @qbg0(q0)q0 = 0; it follows that
@qH(0; q0) =
"  2q00     2q0J
@qbg0(q0)
#
has full rank, J + 1:
We dene H : [0; 1]Q IRS+1++ ! IRJ+1 by





t bG(q; e1) + (1   t)bg0(q);
where bG(q; e1) = bg1(q; e1)+PHh=2 bgh(q): We show next that H : (0; 1)Q IRS+1++ ! IRJ+1
is transversal to zero, or equivalently, that @t;q;e1H(t; q; e1) has full row rank whenever
H(t; q; e1) = 0:




0 =  qj0 ; j
0
j0 = q0; and 
j0
j = 0; j 6= 0;
j 6= j0: Then changing the initial endowment of agent 1 to e1 + Aj0 with  suciently
small, changes his asset demand to g1(q; e1)  j0 : Since the vectors j0 ; j 0 = 1; : : : ; J; are
independent, even with component 0 deleted, it follows that @e1 bG(q; e1) has rank J:
Homogeneity of degree zero of bG in asset prices implies @q bG(q; e1)q = 0: It follows that
@t;q;e1H(t; q; e1) has rank J +1: By the transversal density theorem, see Mas-Colell (1985),
I.2.2, page 45, the set of economies for which @t;qH(t; q) has full rank for all points in
H 1(f0g) has full Lebesgue measure.
Exactly the same argument shows that for a set of initial endowments with full Lebesgue
measure @qH(1; q) has full rank for points in H 1(f0g) \ (f1g Q):
The transversality proofs given, show that for a set of initial endowments with full
Lebesgue measure H 1(f0g) is a C2 1-dimensional manifold with boundary, where the
boundary is given by H 1(f0g) \ (f0; 1g Q):
Using Lemma A.1.3, it follows by a standard argument that the set of initial endow-
ments for which transversality holds can be taken open and of full Lebesgue measure.
Concluding, for an open set of initial endowments with full Lebesgue measure,H 1(f0g)
is a compact C2 1-dimensional manifold with boundary, therefore a nite collection of arc-
s and loops.9 Each arc has two boundary points. Since all boundary points belong to
f0; 1gQ; and there is exactly one boundary point in f0gQ; it follows that for an open
set of initial endowments with full Lebesgue measure, there is an odd number of solutions
in H 1(f0g) \ (f1g Q): Q.E.D.
SinceH is a system of J+1 independent continuous equations in J+2 variables, it is not
surprising that H 1(f0g) is generically a compact 1-dimensional manifold with boundary,
i.e. a nite collection of arcs and loops. There is a unique solution to H(0; q) = 0; obtained
by taking q equal to @u0(e0)A: The boundary behavior of G guarantees that there is no
9An arc is a set homeomorphic to the unit interval and a loop a set homeomorphic to the unit circle.
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sequence (tn; qn)n2IN in H 1(f0g) converging to (t; q) 2 [0; 1]  @Q: Therefore the unique
solution to H(0; q) = 0 is generically part of a path in H 1(f0g) that does not run o to
the boundary, but reaches t = 1: The unique solution to H(0; q) = 0 is thereby connected
to exactly one point (1; q) 2 H 1(f0g); a competitive equilibrium for E; and the homotopy
converges. A more detailed description of homotopy like methods, as well as similar generic
convergence results, can be found in Brown, DeMarzo and Eaves (1996), Herings (1997),
or Schmedders (1998). Notice that there is no need to compute the set Q explicitly. Our
homotopy is constructed in such a way that its projection on the set Q stays away from @Q:
Corollary A.3: Let E be an economy satisfying Assumption A1. Then, for an open
set of initial endowments with full Lebesgue measure, the homotopy H converges to a com-
petitive equilibrium.
If there are multiple equilibria, then in addition to the arc connecting q0 and a compet-
itive equilibrium q; there is a nite number of arcs, each one having two more competitive
equilibria as its end points. This gives a constructive proof of the fact that there is an
odd number of competitive equilibria. In fact, using the properties of a homotopy, we can
get an index theorem for our economy, a result already obtained by Hens (1991), and, for
certain classes of economies with more than one good per state, by Schmedders (1998).
The computation of the demand for assets as a function of prices is not necessarily an
easy problem. It is notoriously hard when the asset market is incomplete. The theoretical
homotopy H will therefore be replaced by the dieomorphic implementable homotopy
H : [0; 1]Q IR(H+1)(J+1)  IRH+1 ! IR1+J+(H+1)(J+1);







j ; j = 1; : : : ; J;
@uh(eh +Ah)A  hq>; h = 0; : : :H;
q  h; h = 0; : : : ;H:
We have replaced the demand functions of the agents by their rst order conditions, an
approach proposed in Garcia and Zangwill (1981).
Theorem A.4: Let E be an economy satisfying Assumption A1. Then H 1(f0g) is
C2 dieomorphic to H 1(f0g):
Proof. It holds that (t; q; ; ) 2 H 1(f0g) if and only if (t; q) 2 H 1(f0g); h = gh(q);
h = 0; : : : ;H; and 
h
= @uh(eh + Agh(q))A; h = 0; : : : ;H: The claim follows since gh and
@uh are twice continuously dierentiable functions. Q.E.D.
Since H 1(f0g) is dieomorphic to H 1(f0g); the results of Theorem A.2 carry over
to H 1(f0g):
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Corollary A.5: Let E be an economy satisfying Assumption A1. Then, for an open
set of initial endowments with full Lebesgue measure, the homotopy H converges to a com-
petitive equilibrium.
The speed of homotopy algorithms depends mainly on two factors, the number of
equations and the arc length of the homotopy path. A quick comparison shows the great
benets of developing a special purpose homotopy tailored to the nance GEI-model. The
homotopy algorithms as reported in Brown, DeMarzo and Eaves (1996) and Schmedders
(1998) are designed to deal with the general GEI-model with multiple commodities per
state, but can be applied to nance economies.
The homotopy proposed by Brown, DeMarzo and Eaves (1996) needs closed form so-
lutions for excess demand functions and should therefore be compared with our homotopy
H: Applied to two-period nance economies, their algorithm has 2S+1 equations, whereas
ours only has J + 1: The algorithm of Schmedders (1998) does not require closed-form so-
lutions for excess demand functions, and also uses the rst order conditions. The number
of equations of his algorithm amounts to 2(H + 1)(S + 1) +HJ + 1; whereas the number
of equations in our algorithm H equals (H + 2)(J + 1):
In both cases, we roughly need a fraction J=2S only of the equations of alternative
algorithms. This is especially favorable when S is high, which is exactly the case for the kind
of applications in this paper. In fact, in most applications we have J = 8 and S = 32; 768:
The high number of states is used to get a good discrete approximation of a continuously
distributed multivariate random variable. On top of the great number of equations saved,
our method also has the exibility of choosing the initial price system as desired, contrary
to the homotopies of Brown, DeMarzo and Eaves (1996) or Schmedders (1998). Since it is
not too hard to make a reasonable guess for an equilibrium price system using the CAPM
or the method of the next subsection, our algorithm will generally substantially reduce the
arc length of the homotopy path.
Implementation
We implemented the algorithm using HOMPACK - a suite of FORTRAN 77 subroutines
designed to solve systems of non-linear homotopy equations with path-following methods.
See Watson (1979) and Watson, Billups and Morgan (1987) for details on HOMPACK.
We now turn to the determination of the starting point and the specication of the
articial agent's demand function.
The demand function g0(q) should be chosen such that an a priori selected starting
point q0 2 Q withPJj=0(q0j )2 = 1 is the unique solution to g0(q) = 0 and PJj=0(qj)2 1 = 0:







0 2 IRS+1++ :
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Let 0 2 IRS+1++ be any state price vector such that 0>A = q0: If the articial agent is
dened by
e0s = 1; s = 0; : : : ; S;
s = 
0
s=s; s = 0; : : : ; S;





2   1 = 0 is indeed given by q0:
In applications, there is usually no need to solve for >A = q0:10 Instead, we take 0
equal to the weighted average over all agents of @uh(eh); with weight for agent h equal
to 1=h; where h denotes the marginal utility of rst period consumption at the initial
endowment eh: Next we take q0 equal to 0
>
A=k0>Ak2:
The use of a Cobb-Douglas utility function yields a simple way to get any a priori
specied asset price system as the unique zero point. Another advantage of using a Cobb-
Douglas utility function is that numerical experience shows that convergence takes place
faster for low values of relative risk aversion.
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